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PAULO DE TARSO LUGON ARANTES1*
Abstract
Both national and international jurisprudences have consistently 
limited freedom of expression when it aims at the destruction of 
rights of others, or if it consists of glorification or incitement of 
violence or hate speech. Beyond the classic liberal thinking, by 
which States should not interfere with the individual domains, 
contemporary society also requires that States intervene in pri-
vate relations in order to guarantee fundamental rights, implying 
State positive obligations. This new State’s function frequently 
requires a role of arbiter of conflicts between fundamental rights. 
Nevertheless, this role is not performed without significant cha-
llenges. Current jurisprudence has faced no difficulty to ban blunt 
hate speech, glorification of violence and destruction of rights of 
the others, which was mainly pronounced by the earlier extremist 
movements. However the re-shaping of some of these movements 
leads to a sophistication of their discourse, in order to locate it 
just in the grey zone of legality. For example, this sophisticated 
discourse abolishes physical violence to work on charisma and on 
“rule of law”, in order to reach hearts and minds of the population 
at large, mainly in the electoral debate. A challenge for the juris-
prudence seems to delineate the border between the democratic 
manner by which such discourse is pronounced (form) and the 
discourse itself (content). In this context, there is a clear need to 
re-balance the current standards. Moreover it is reasonable to ask 
to what extent the techniques used by international monitoring 
bodies (e.g. margin of appreciation) still operate satisfactorily in 
these cases.
1 * L.L.M. International and European Protection of Human Rights, University 
of Utrecht; Ph.D. Candidate, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.
Keywords: hate speech, sophisticated discourse, margin of appre-
ciation, extremist platforms.
Resumen
Las jurisprudencias nacional y internacional han limitado la li-
bertad de expresión cuando su objetivo es la destrucción de los 
derechos de los demás, o si se trata de la glorificación o incitación 
a la violencia o la incitación al odio. Más allá del pensamiento 
liberal clásico, por el cual los Estados no deben interferir en el 
ámbito privado, la sociedad contemporánea requiere también que 
los Estados intervengan en las relaciones privadas con el fin de 
garantizar los derechos fundamentales, lo que implica obligaciones 
positivas del Estado. Esta nueva fución del Estado requiere a me-
nudo un papel de árbitro de los conflictos entre los derechos fun-
damentales. Sin embargo, esta función no se realiza sin problemas 
cruciales. La jurisprudencia actual no ha enfrentado dificultades 
para prohibir la incitación al odio, la glorificación de la violencia 
y la destrucción de los derechos de los demás, que principalmente 
fue pronunciada por los primeros movimientos extremistas. Sin 
embargo, la reconfiguración de algunos de estos movimientos da 
lugar a una sofisticación de su discurso, con el fin de ubicarlos en 
la zona gris de la legalidad. Por ejemplo, este discurso sofisticado 
suprime la violencia física para trabajar en carisma y en “estado de 
derecho”, a fin de llegar a los corazones y las mentes de la pobla-
ción en general, principalmente en el debate electoral. Un desafío 
para la jurisprudencia es lo de delimitar la frontera entre la forma 
democrática de tal discurso que se pronuncia (forma) y el propio 
discurso (contenido). En este contexto, existe una clara necesidad 
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de volver a equilibrar las reglas actuales. Por otra parte, es razo-
nable preguntarse hasta qué punto las técnicas utilizadas por los 
órganos de supervisión internacional (por ejemplo, el margen de 
apreciación) todavía funcionan de manera satisfactoria en estos 
casos.
Palabras claves: discurso odioso, discurso sofisticado, margen de 
apreciación, plataformas extremistas.
INTRODUCTION
One of the most proficuous fields of society to test human 
rights law theory is surely the conflicts between fundamental 
rights. While the drafters of the main international human 
rights instruments were primarily concerned to establish a 
list of the most fundamental rights, only a few rules on the 
co-existence of these rights were set. However, our dynamic 
society requires constant and prompt answers, which have 
been incumbent to the human rights (judicial or quasi-judi-
cial) monitoring bodies. Perhaps one of the most intriguing 
studies is the conflict between freedom of expression and the 
right to be treated equally. 
Both rights co-exist in the most relevant human rights ins-
truments2 and have been clarified by the relevant case-law. 
Freedom of expression, according to the case-law of the re-
levant monitoring bodies, has been understood as one of the 
key features of a democratic society.3 The right to equality 
has been understood as one of the most important features 
of the protection of fundamental rights.4
The scope of this work, however, is not to establish any hie-
rarchical distinction between the two rights. Rather, this 
2 Right to equal treatment: ICCPR, Art. 26; ECHR, Art. 14; and ACHR, Art 
24. Freedom of expression: ICCPR, Art. 19.2; ECHR, Art. 10.1; ACHR, Art. 
13.1.
3 For instance: EurCtHR, case of Castells v. Spain, judgment of 23/04/1992. Se-
ries 1, No. 236, § 42; I/ACtHR, case of Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru, judgment of 
5/09/2001. Series C, No. 74, § 146; HRC, case of Aduayom v. Togo, views 
of 24/07/1996, UN Doc.: CCPR/C/57/D/424/1990, § 7.4; ACHPR, case of 
Media Rights Agenda and Constitutional Rights Project v. Nigeria, decision of 
31/10/1998, § 54.
4 V.g: I/ACtHR: Proposed Amendments of the Naturalization Provisions of the 
Constitution of Costa Rica: “The notion of equality springs directly from the 
oneness of the human family and is linked to the essential dignity of the in-
dividual. That principle cannot be reconciled with the notion that a given 
group has the right to privileged treatment because of its perceived superio-
rity. It is equally irreconcilable with that notion to characterize a group as 
inferior and treat it with hostility or otherwise subject it to discrimination 
in the enjoyment of rights which are accorded to others not so classified. It 
is impermissible to subject human beings to differences in treatment that are 
inconsistent with their unique and congenerous character. Advisory Opinion 
OC-4/84 of January 19, 1984. Series A No. 4, § 55.
work goes in line with the Vienna Declaration and Progra-
mme of Action, by which that “all human rights are uni-
versal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated”.5 In 
fact, the present article has the purpose of finding how both 
rights might harmoniously co-exist in society, according to 
the decisions of the international human rights monitoring 
bodies and with the writings of the respective experts. Mo-
reover, this work aims addressing the recent social pheno-
menon called “the sophistication of the discourse”, which 
tends to be in conflict with the right to the prohibition of 
discrimination. A myriad of other works has been written 
and debated on the topic of hate speech and glorification 
of violence. For these blunt and extreme violations, inter-
national human rights case law has provided a satisfactory 
protection. Nowadays, such violent discourse has been 
mostly proffered by low-profile speakers, with low impact 
in any decision-making process. For instance, the neo-nazis 
and the skinheads are composed of mid-low class young per-
sons, low-educated, who are already marginalized by society 
(McVeigh, 2004). These groups are the ones ostensibly wea-
ring racialist symbols and shouting old jargons, but which 
are an easy catch for the law-enforcement systems in their 
countries, since most States have already legally criminali-
zed such behavior.6 Besides these groups, a few intellectuals 
have publicly denied the holocaust, but have soon later 
been tried and punished for these acts.
THE SOPHISTICATION OF THE POLITICAL DIS-
COURSE
The edge-test of the conflicts between these two rights has 
naturally migrated to a more subtle and sophisticated realm, 
5 Art. 5 of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action reads as follows: 
“5. All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and inte-
rrelated. The international community must treat human rights globally in 
a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis. 
While the significance of national and regional particularities and various 
historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the 
duty of States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to 
promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms.” Adopted 
on 12/07/1993. UN Doc.: A/CONF.157/23.
6 For instance, India’s criminal code, Section 153, defines as offence the 
promotion of enmity between different groups on grounds of religion, race, 
place of birth, language etc and doing acts prejudicial to maintenance of 
harmony or prejudicial to national integration; Austria’s criminal code, § 
283, penalizes the induction and incitement for racial hatred in a manner 
likely to endanger public order; Belgium’s Racism and Xenophobia Act 
(“Moureaux Law”), amended in 1994, criminalizes several discriminatory 
acts, including incitement and advocacy for racialist and hatred ideas; and 
Denmark’s penal code (1987), Articles 266 and 626b, criminalizing hate 
speech and racial violence.
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including the new political platforms, which seem to have 
sensitively reshaped their profiles in order to adjust to the 
current standards (Shoemaker and Snijder, 2000). The new 
arena is the formal democratic debate, including polite and 
respectful exchange of ideas and the conquest of voters’ 
hearts and minds. The new language is the politeness and 
the formal respect for democracy and fundamental rights 
achieved by the western civilized society, including an ex-
press mention to these values in their political programs. 
The objectives of such parties are desired and sought by the 
whole society, like economic growth, peace, rule of law, free-
dom and security. At a face value, their platforms and modus
operandi cannot always be said to be hygienist, but on the 
contrary, their members seek to demonstrate respect for de-
mocracy and equality.
However, the means to achieve their sound political ends 
deserve a careful consideration. Last decade’s economic glo-
bal recession and 11/9 attacks have exposed a number of 
fragilities of the North-Atlantic society, posing it a crucial 
existential dilemma, which is self-evident among the current 
debates. As a consequence, the “they-and-us” paradigm see-
med to suit as an answer to high unemployment rates and to 
the hopelessness in the future. For instance, the calls for the 
optimization of the national economies, including corporate 
downsizing and job cuts, is seasoned by the advocates of such 
platforms with the motto “our people first”. The suggestion 
of a state of necessity tries to justify to society a flexibiliza-
tion of the current dignity standards, including tolerance and 
social inclusion. This dichotomist and excluding paradigm 
has a direct effect on the most vulnerable strata of society, 
particularly non-nationals, religious and ethnic minorities 
and the economically disadvantaged citizens (McClennen, 
2006). According to Mr. Diène, former UN Special Rappor-
teur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, the fight against 
terrorism has been taken so intensely that leaves the striving 
for equality to a lower priority. He explains:
The political and ideological context of the fight 
against terrorism is not only generating new forms 
of discrimination owing to its potential explosion for 
political ends, but may also succeed in marginalizing 
the fight against racism owing to the political priority 
given to anti-terrorism.7
7 UN Commission on Human Rights: Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xeno-
phobia and All Forms of Discrimination – Political platforms which promote 
or incite racial discrimination. Updated study by the Special Rapporteur on 
In such a critical environment stimulated by the fear for 
terrorism, a sort of conservatism and protectionism takes 
place in the forms of protection of “national heritage”, “na-
tional preference in employment” and combat of “illegal 
immigration”.8 In this regard, Mr. Diène states: 
Against the background of the general trend towards 
multiculturalism in most societies, this rhetoric be-
comes the new political expression of discrimination 
and xenophobia owing to its main political projec-
tions: a rejection or non-recognition of multicultu-
ralism and cultural diversity and especially an identi-
fication of all those the nation needs to defend itself 
against, namely non-nationals, ethnic, cultural or re-
ligious minorities, immigrants and asylum-seekers.9
Here is where racism and xenophobia converge. While both 
terms have distinct definitions,10 both phenomena work 
in detriment of migrants’ or other vulnerable groups fun-
damental rights. The political capitalization on the fears of 
the population, with a notable racist or xenophobic over-
contermporary forms of racism, racial intolerance, racial discrimination, xe-
nophobia and related intolerance, Doudou Diène. Adopted on 13/01/2006. 
UN Doc.: E/CN.4/2006/54, p. 4.
8 See, for instance, UK’s BNP’s mission statement: “The British National Party 
exists to secure a future for the indigenous peoples of these islands in the 
North Atlantic which have been our homeland for millennia. We use the 
term indigenous to describe the people whose ancestors were the earliest sett-
lers here after the last great Ice Age and which have been complemented by 
the historic migrations from mainland Europe. The migrations of the Celts, 
Anglo-Saxons, Danes, Norse and closely related kindred peoples have been, 
over the past few thousands years, instrumental in defining the character of 
our family of nations (…)The rich legacy of tradition, legend, myth and very 
real wealth of landscape and man-made structures is one of our island’s richest 
treasures. The men and women of the British National Party are motivated 
by love and admiration of the outpouring of culture, art, literature and the 
pattern of living through the ages that has left its mark on our very landscape. 
We value the folkways and customs which have been passed down through 
countless generations. We enthuse with pride at the marvels of architecture 
and engineering that have been completed on these islands since the cons-
truction of the great megaliths 7,000 years ago.”
9 UN Commission on Human Rights: Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xeno-
phobia and All Forms of Discrimination, supra, p. 5. 
10 Racism consists of an “ideological construct that assigns a certain race and/or 
ethnic group to a position of power over others on the basis of physical and 
cultural attributes, as well as economic wealth, involving hierarchical rela-
tions, where the ‘superior’ race exercises domination and control over others”, 
whereas xenophobia “describes attitudes, prejudices and behavior that reject, 
exclude and often vilify persons, based on the perception that they are out-
siders or foreigners to the community, society or national identity”. “Racism 
and Migration”, in: Dimensions of Racism – Proceedings of a Workshop to comme-
morate the end of the 3
rd
 decade to combat racism and racial discrimination, Paris, 
19-20 February 2003. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (OHCHR), in cooperation with the United Nations Educa-
tional, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). UN, New York and 
Geneva, 2005.
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tone is one of the most challenging forms of contemporary 
discrimination.
In short, the main scope of this paper is to analyze to what 
extent the international human rights case-law gives a pro-
per response to this new challenge: the sophistication of the 
political discourse. 
A LEGAL ASSESSMENT
To begin the legal assessment, it is worthy mentioning that 
contemporary human rights law has significantly changed 
from a system that requires States to abstain from violating 
fundamental rights and freedoms, to one that requires them 
to guarantee the enjoyment of these rights. In this sense, 
there is a consensus among the diverse monitoring bodies, 
regardless of the nature of the rights in question.11 The in-
ternational case-law has consistently asserted that viola-
tions of fundamental rights may also occur in relation with 
two or more non-state actors. This assertion goes hand in 
hand with the theory of Drittwirkung (horizontal effect) of 
human rights treaties. (Matscher and Petzold, 1988; Pabón 
de Acuña, 1991; Sudre, 1995; Spielman, 1998). Under this 
perspective, in addition to the traditional “State-individual” 
relation - where States stand in the “respecter” role, the new 
“individual-State-individual” requires States to be arbiters 
of conflicts of the fundamental rights between the indivi-
duals under their jurisdiction. Such a role involves the task 
of setting-up the rules of harmonic social life and to watch 
over their compliance. By discharging this duty, States ne-
cessarily are called to rule on the co-existence of fundamen-
tal rights, including the right to be equally treated and free-
dom of expression.
11 This common understanding is found in the following case-law: I/ACtHR: 
case of Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, judgment of July 29, 1988. Series C - 
No. 4, § 182; Eur. Court H.R. cases of Pla and Puncernau v. Andorra. Judgment 
of 13/07/2004, § 59; Osman v. United Kingdom, Grand Chamber Judgment of 
28/10/1998. Reports 1998-VIII, § 115 and von Hannover v. Germany, judgment 
of 24/06/2004, Reports 2004-VI, § 57; HRC: General Comment 31 - Nature of 
the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant. Adopted 
on 26/05/2004. UN Doc.: CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, § 8; ACHRP: Case of 
Commission Nationale des Droits de l’Homme et des Libertés v. Chad. Communi-
cation. No. 74/92 (1995), § 22; CAT Committee: case of Hajrizi Dzemajl et al. 
v. Yugoslavia, decision of 21/11/2002. UN Doc.: CAT/C/29/D/161/2000, § 9.2; 
CESCR: General Comment 18: The Right to Work, adopted on 06/02/2006. 
UN. Doc.: E/C.12/GC/18, § 25 ; General Comment 12 – The Right to Adequate 
Food, adopted on 12/05/99. UN Doc.: E/C.12/1999/5. See, in general: Mow-
bray, A: The Development of Positive Obligations under the European Convention 
on Human Rights by the European Court of Human Rights, Hart, Oxford, 2004.
1. Duties in Freedom of Expression and Margin of Appre-
ciation
A natural consequence of the existence of the horizontal 
effect of human rights treaties provisions is the appearance 
of duties upon actors others than States. In fact, the main 
human rights treaties establish specific duties in freedom of 
expression. For instance, in interpreting Art. 10.2 of the 
ECHR (limitation of freedom of expression), the EurCtHR, 
in the case of Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, has ruled 
that the related responsibility, in the context of religious be-
liefs of others, consists of avoiding: 
[…] as far as possible expressions that are gratuitously 
offensive to others and thus an infringement to their 
rights, and which therefore do not contribute to any 
form of public debate capable of furthering progress 
in human affairs”.12
A number of other international instruments provide for 
duties upon non-state actors. By way of example, the “Va-
lencia Declaration”, in its Art. 17, imposes on these actors 
a series of duties on freedom of expression, including the 
duties on media and on journalists to perform honestly and 
to avoid incitement to racial, ethnic and religions hate and 
violence.13
However, since States are the only actors in international 
society who formally express their consent to be bound 
by treaties, the decisions of the international (and quasi-
judicial) monitoring bodies are binding only to States. The 
control over the activities of non-state actors are made only 
indirectly, generally via the so-called positive obligations, 
by which States must guarantee the enjoyment of a funda-
mental right of an actor, by restricting the liberty of ano-
ther actor. In these circumstances, States have a clear role 
of arbiter, having to decide on the conflicts of fundamental 
rights at stake. Therefore, States have the task to find an 
optimal pacifying solution among the competing interests in 
society, as the EurCtHR has constantly stated:
12 EurCtHR: cases of Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, judgment of 20/09/1994. 
Series A, no. 295-A, § 49; Wingrove v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 
25/11/1996. Reports 1996-V, § 52; and Gündüz v. Turkey, judgment of 
14/06/2004, Reports 2003, XI, § 37.
13 Declaration on Human Duties and Responsibilities, Art. 17.2, reads as fo-
llows: “The media and journalists have a duty to report honestly and accura-
tely and to avoid incitement of racial, ethnic or religious violence or hatred.”
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There should be a compromise between the requi-
rement of defending a democratic society and indi-
vidual rights, as an inherent feature of the Conven-
tion.14
Likewise, HRC’s General Comment 10 rules that “the rights 
for the protection of which restrictions on the freedom of 
expression are permitted by article 19, paragraph 3, may re-
late to the interests of other persons or to those of the com-
munity as a whole.” The HRC reiterated in the same appro-
ach in the case of Ross v. Canada15, involving a teacher who 
was spreading anti-semitic ideas in classroom. The HRC, 
although implicitly, seems also to call for a compromising 
solution between the competing interests between freedom 
of expression and the prohibition of discrimination.
Despite that the decisions of the international human rights 
monitoring bodies are applicable only to States, some eva-
luations on the behavior of non-state actors are found in 
the treaties and in the case-law, in addition to the specific 
treaty provisions above mentioned. The EurCtHR’s Grand 
Chamber judgment in the case of Sürek v. Turkey (No. 4)
provides a clear picture on how behaviors are dictated not 
only to States but to private parties. On evaluating the role 
of the media, particularly in times of armed conflict, this 
court has stated:
The Court stresses that the “duties and responsibi-
lities” which accompany the exercise of the right to 
freedom of expression by media professionals assu-
me special significance in situations of conflict and 
tension. Particular caution is called for when con-
sideration is being given to the publication of views 
of representatives of organisations which resort to 
violence against the State lest the media become a 
vehicle for the dissemination of hate speech and the 
promotion of violence.
The Court went on reasoning:
Tolerance and respect for the equal dignity of all 
human beings constitute the foundations of a demo-
cratic, pluralist society. That being so, as a matter of 
14 EurCtHR: cases of United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey,
Grand Chamber judgment of 30/01/1998. Reports 1998-I, § 31; and of Klass
and Others v. Germany, judgment of 6/09/1978. Series A, No. 28, § 59. 
15 HRC: case of Ross v. Canada, views of 18/10/2000. UN Doc. CCPR/
C/70/D/736/1997, § 9.6.
principle, it may be considered necessary in certain 
democratic societies to sanction or even prevent 
forms of expression which spread, incite, promote or 
justify hatred based on intolerance (including reli-
gious intolerance), provided that any “formalities”, 
“conditions”, “restrictions”, or “penalties” imposed 
are proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.16
Nevertheless, as a consequence of the indirect horizontal 
application of human rights treaties, the behavior of non-
state actors is controlled through the States’ positive obliga-
tions, imposed by the relevant monitoring bodies. In doing 
so, a review of States’ actions that might reduce freedom 
of expression is conducted by human rights monitoring bo-
dies. This review is synthesized in the EurCtHR’s margin of 
appreciation theory, whereby States are afforded some mar-
gin of discretion to implement the ECHR’s provisions, pro-
vided that the interference is carried out in accordance with 
the law, is legitimate and necessary in a democratic society 
(Schokkenbroek, 1998). The scope of margin of apprecia-
tion varies according to the right in question. As regards 
freedom of expression, the EurCtHR grants a very limited 
margin of appreciation to States in restricting freedom of 
expression.17 Accordingly, this court understands that “the 
dangers inherent in prior restraints are such that they call 
for the most careful scrutiny on the [court’s] part”.18
Theoretically, this court is prepared to take into account 
the challenges that the State may face on certain occasions, 
including fight against terrorism or threatens to the public 
disorder, as it has decided in a number of cases against Tur-
key.19 To date, the factual circumstances of the cases brought 
to the Court were nevertheless not sufficiently relevant to 
diminish this scrutiny threshold. The narrow margin of 
appreciation afforded to States in the above cases seems to 
relate to circumstances involving preponderantly a State-in-
dividual relation, which calls for the ‘State-respecter’ role.
However, in cases related to conflicts between personal con-
victions of certain groups, including reputation and religious 
beliefs, The EuCtHR has allowed States to exercise a wider 
16 EurCtHR: case of Sürek v. Turkey (No. 4), Grand Chamber judgment of 
08/07/1999, § 60. See also Grand Chamber judgment in the case of Erdo_du
and Ince v. Turkey of 08/07/1999, Reports 1999-IV, § 54.
17 E.g. case of Wingrove v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 25/11/1996. Reports 
1996-V, § 58.
18 The Observer and the Guardian v. UK (Spycatcher Case), § 60.
19 EuCtHR: cases of Gerger 1 v. Turkey, § 49; and Incal v. Turkey, § 58. 
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margin of appreciation, as it ruled in the case of Gunduz v. 
Turkey, involving a heated television debate on sharia and 
secularism:
[…] a certain margin of appreciation is generally 
available to the Contracting States when regulating 
freedom of expression in relation to matters liable 
to offend intimate personal convictions within the 
sphere of morals or, especially, religion.20
Therefore, the control exercised by the EurCtHR, in cases 
related to the ‘State-arbiter’ role on conflicts of freedom of 
expression and the prohibition of discrimination is laxer 
than the ones related to the ‘State respecter’ role. Moreover, 
in assessing the necessity criterion in the imposition of sanc-
tions on the private violators, this court requires that States 
demonstrate the proportionality between the gravity of the 
offense and the sanction applies. This is the reason why in 
a number of cases, although recognizing a violation of a pri-
vate party, this court rules that the State violated freedom 
of expression because the sanction imposed was exceedingly 
severe in relation to the damage caused by this non-state 
actor. This is illustrated in the case of Cump n  and Maz
re v. Romania, involving an insulting journalist article about 
political figures. This court deemed that, though the article 
was lightweighted and not substantiated, damaging the re-
putation of another person, the imposition of imprisonment 
amounted to chilling effect, therefore violating Art 10 of 
the ECHR.21 Likewise, in the above mentioned case of Gün-
düz v. Turkey, although this court has also found that the 
statements of the applicant had offended the national socie-
ty, by using improper wording and attacking secularism, the 
imposition of a two-years imprisonment sentence over him 
amounted to a disproportionate measure.22
In sum, it can be observed that human rights case-law, 
particularly the European system, greatly underscores the 
‘State-respecter’ role, in detriment of the ‘State-arbiter’ 
role. Consequently, freedom of expression is to be widely 
interpreted and restrictions thereto are carefully scrutinized 
by the international monitoring bodies, even when very a 
20 EurCtHR: case of Gündüz v. Turkey, judgment of 04/12/2003, Reports 2003-
XI, § 37. See also, cases of Müller and Others v. Switzerland, judgment of 
24/05/1988, Series A no. 133, § 35; and Murphy v. Ireland, Reports 2003-IX 
§§ 65-69.
21 EurCtHR; case of Cump n  and Maz re v. Romania, Grand Chamber judg-
ment of 17/12/2004. Reports 2004-XI, § 113.
22 EurCtHR: case of Gündüz v. Turkey, supra note, § 52.
controversial speech is at stake, as it is examined in the fo-
llowing section. 
2. The Level of Controversy Amounting to Hate Speech 
Some human rights treaties provide for express restriction of 
hate speech, although with different wording. The ICERD, 
due to its specificity, has the most comprehensive list of 
prohibitive speech, including the obligation to ban organi-
zations that disseminate ideas based on racial superiority.23
Art. 20 of the ICCPR states that propaganda of war, advoca-
cy of national, racial or religious hatred shall be prohibited 
by law. Art. 13.5 of the ACHR has basically the same con-
tent than the one of ICCPR.24 The ECHR, however, does 
not have a specific provision on the restriction of speech, 
but such control is today made by the EurCtHR.
Accordingly, under human rights law, it remains clear that 
States are under an obligation to adopt legislation to prohi-
bit hate speech, as well as to enforce this legislation through 
their judicial institutions. Should an applicant be found ex-
pressing hate speech or glorification of violence, she or he 
is not to be protected by a treaty provision on freedom of 
expression. In this regard the EurCtHR consistently states:
concrete expressions consisting of hate speech, which may 
be insulting to particular individuals or groups, are not pro-
tected by Art. 10 (freedom of expression) of the ECHR.25
23 Art. 4 of ICERD reads as follows: “States Parties condemn all propaganda and 
all organizations which are based on ideas or theories of superiority of one race 
or group of persons of one colour or ethnic origin, or which attempt to justify 
or promote racial hatred and discrimination in any form, and undertake to 
adopt immediate and positive measures designed to eradicate all incitement 
to, or acts of, such discrimination and, to this end, with due regard to the 
principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
rights expressly set forth in article 5 of this Convention, inter alia: (a) Shall 
declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial 
superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts 
of violence or incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons of 
another colour or ethnic origin, and also the provision of any assistance to 
racist activities, including the financing thereof; (b) Shall declare illegal and 
prohibit organizations, and also organized and all other propaganda activities, 
which promote and incite racial discrimination, and shall recognize partici-
pation in such organizations or activities as an offence punishable by law; (c) 
Shall not permit public authorities or public institutions, national or local, to 
promote or incite racial discrimination.
24 Art. 13.5 of the ACHR reads as follows: “Any propaganda for war and any 
advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitute incitements to 
lawless violence or to any other similar action against any person or group of 
persons on any grounds including those of race, color, religion, language, or 
national origin shall be considered as offenses punishable by law.”
25 V.g: EurCtHR: case of Sürek v. Turkey (no. 1), Grand Chamber judgment of 
08/07/1999. Reports 1999-IV, § 62.
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However, the monitoring bodies have 
not elaborated a clear definition of hate 
speech themselves. The content of hate 
speech can be almost indirectly inferred 
by their jurisprudences. HRC’s General 
Comment 11 states that “any propagan-
da for war and any advocacy of national, 
racial or religious hatred that constitutes 
incitement to discrimination, hostility or 
violence shall be prohibited by law.” It 
goes on reasoning:
“In the opinion of the Commit-
tee, these required prohibitions 
are fully compatible with the right 
of freedom of expression as contai-
ned in article 19 […] The prohibi-
tion under paragraph 1 extends to 
all forms of propaganda threatening or resulting in an 
act of aggression or breach of the peace contrary to 
the Charter of the United Nations, while paragraph 
2 is directed against any advocacy of national, racial 
or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to dis-
crimination, hostility or violence, whether such pro-
paganda or advocacy has aims which are internal or 
external to the State concerned.”26
While affirming that the restrictions to freedom of expres-
sion are compatible with the exercise of freedom of ex-
pression, the meaning of hatred in this General Comment 
remains without further elaborating on its possible compo-
nents. Therefore, only propaganda of war and hatred seems 
to be prohibited by States.
CERD’s recent General Recommendation 30, on discrimi-
nation against non-citizens, requests States to take stapes 
to address xenophobic attitudes and behaviors towards non-
citizens, including hate speech and racial violence, as well 
as to promote a better understanding of the principle of 
non-discrimination, as regards the situation of non-citizens. 
This General Recommendation also urges States to take a 
resolute action to stop tendencies that target, stigmatize, 
stereotype and profile individuals, based on race, descent, 
national or ethnic origin and members of non-citizen popu-
26 HRC: General Comment 11: Prohibition of propaganda for war and inciting natio-
nal, racial or religious hatred. Adopted on 29/07/1983. UN Doc.: CCPR/C/21/
Rev.1, § 2.
lation groups.27 This general comment seems to give a more 
detailed explanation on which acts should be prohibited, 
but does not elaborate further on the content of hate speech.
The EurCtHR, on its turn, has adopted the concept of hate 
speech from the Recommendation No. R (97) 20 of the 
CoE’s Committee of Ministers28, whereby it states that hate 
speech is “understood as covering all forms of expression 
which spread, incite, promote or justify racial hatred, xe-
nophobia, anti-Semitism or other forms of hatred based on 
intolerance.”29 Complementarily, this Court has evidenced 
in its judgment certain behaviors of applicants that amount 
to hate speech. For instance in the case of Sürek v. Turkey, it 
noted that the applicant’s intention was clearly to stigmatise 
the other side (the Turkish army), labelling it as “fascist”, 
“murder gang” and the “hired killers of imperialism”. The 
court observes that, in connection with the stigmatising 
words, the applicant diffuses in his letters an evocation to 
bloody revenge and deadly violence, as regards the already 
turmoiled situation in south-east Turkey. The Court also no-
tes that the applicant’s impugned letters identify persons by 
names, posing them to a real risk of physical violence. Due 
27 CERD General Recommendation 30: Discrimination Against Non-Citizens,
adopted on 01/10/2004., UN Doc.: CERD/C/64/Misc.11/rev.3, § 2.
28 Council of Europe: “Recommendation No. R (97) 20 on Hate Speech”, adop-
ted on 30/11/1997, on the 607
th
 Meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies. 
29 According to the scope of this Recommendation, hate speech shall mean 
“all forms of expression which spread, incite, promote or justify racial hatred, 
xenophobia, anti-Semitism or other forms of hatred based on intolerance, in-
cluding: intolerance expressed by aggressive nationalism and ethnocentrism, 
discrimination and hostility against minorities, migrants and people of immi-
grant origin.”
31The conflicts between freedom of expression and the prohibition of discrimination: the sophistication of the 
discourse and re-thinking of the current standards
18
to these elements, the Court found reasonable the respon-
ding State’s allegation that the applicant’s letters were pro-
hibited in order to protect the State’s territorial integrity.30
In a vast majority of other cases, the EurCtHR has dee-
med that the applicants’ controversial expressions did not 
amounting to hate speech. Generally, the EurCtHR unders-
tands that the protection afforded by in Art. 10 (freedom of 
expression) covers not only the ideas normally accepted by 
a large part of the society, but also “those that offend, shock 
or disturb”31. This view is applied in the case of Gümüs and 
Others v. Turkey, where the Court considered that, though 
the applicants’ hostile narrative on the responding State’s 
affairs as regards the Kurdish issue, it could not be conside-
red as a justifying interference in their freedom of expres-
sion. The underlying reason of this rationale was the fact 
that the applicants did not incite violence or armed resis-
tance in their speech. Therefore, the State could not invoke 
threaten to the national security to justify the necessity of 
imposing sanctions on the applicants. Similarly, in the Gün-
düz judgment, the applicant’s intransigent attitude towards 
secularism and open defense of sharia, without calling for 
violence, cannot be regarded as hate speech.32 Moreover, in 
the case of Koç and Tambas v. Turkey, the applicants’ state-
ment: “the butcher of justice is once again at work”, refe-
rring to the respondent State’s minister of justice, together 
with exaggerated and hostile passages, as well as a very nega-
tive picture of the Turkish State, were not regarded as hate 
speech. This court held that despite the applicants’ virulent 
expressions against the Minister of Justice, these passages 
could not be taken as threatening the Minister to physical 
violence.33
In analyzing the above jurisprudence, one notes that the 
threshold of hate speech is one amounting to grave social 
turmoil and to physical violence, in the imminence of emer-
gency occasions. This threshold can hardly be understood as 
an obligation upon States to halt private actors from advo-
cating against the prohibition of discrimination in times of 
social normality. 
30 EurCtHR: case of Sürek v. Turkey, supra, § 62.
31 E.g.: EurCtHR: cases of Jersild v. Denmark, judgment of 23/09/1994. Series A, 
No. 298, § 37; and Handyside v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 7/12/1976. 
Series A, no. 24, § 49.
32 EurCtHR: case of Gündüz v.Turkey, supra, § 51.
33 EurCtHR: case of Koç and Tambas v. Turkey, judgment of 21/03/2006, § 38.
In the European Union context, Recommendation No. R 
97 (20) encompasses a broader scope of hate speech, inclu-
ding intolerance by ethnocentrism, hostility against mino-
rities, migrants and people of immigrant origin, whereas the 
EurCtHR mostly attaches to hate speech the high potentia-
lity that the discourse in question may lead to physical vio-
lence or disturbance of the State institutions, in detriment 
of other forms of violence the victims of hate speech are 
exposed to, including psychological violence and spreading 
of prejudice. 
3. The Limits of the Controversial Political Discourse
Generally, international human rights case law has attri-
buted the highest value to political debate. The underlying 
reason is that States should allow the widest possible po-
litical debate. One of the indications of the highest value 
of political speech is the EurCtHR’s margin of appreciation 
afforded to States in restricting political expression. This 
margin is even narrower in relation to the general freedom 
of expression as established by its case-law.34
This Court has consistently affirmed that “freedom of politi-
cal debate is at the very core of the concept of a democratic 
society”.35 Therefore, democracy, according to the EurCtHR, 
is seriously perished without the proper exercise of freedom 
of expression. Morever, on the role of media in the political 
debate, the EurCtHR has, since the case of Informationsve-
rein Lentia and Others v. Austria, considered the State as the 
“ultimate guarantor of the principle of pluralism”.36
The HRC alike, grants a privileged place to freedom of ex-
pression in the political debate. Some of its views in conten-
tious cases illustrate this approach. For instance, in the case 
of Zeljko Bodrozic v. Serbia and Montenegro, it states:
[…] in circumstances of public debate in a demo-
cratic society, especially in the media, concerning 
34 V.g. EurCtHR: cases of Lingens v. Austria, judgment of 8/07/1986. Series A no. 
103, § 42; Castells v. Spain, judgment of 23/04/1992. Series A no. 236,§ 43; 
and of Thorgeir Thorgeirson v. Iceland, judgment of 25 June 1992, Series A, no. 
239, § 63.
35 V.g. EurCtHR: cases of Lingens v. Austria, supra, § 42; Oberschlick v. Austria,
Court Plenary judgment of 23/05/1991. Series A, No. 204 § 57; Rekevényi
v. Hungary, judgment of 20/05/1999. Reports 1999-III, § 26; and Lyashko v. 
Ukraine, judgment of 10/08/2006, § 41. 
36 EurCtHR: case of Informationsverein Lentia and Others v. Austria, judgment of 
24/11/1993. Series A, No. 276, § 38.
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figures in the political domain, the value placed by 
the Covenant upon uninhibited expression is parti-
cularly high.37
Further, in the case of Aduayom and others. v. Togo, the HRC 
affirmed:
“[T]he freedoms of information and of expression are 
cornerstones in any free and democratic society. It is 
the essence of such societies that its citizens must be 
allowed to inform themselves about alternatives to 
the political system/parties in power, and that they 
may criticise or openly and publicly evaluate their 
Governments without fear of interference or punis-
hment”.] It follows that the author’s conviction and 
sentence in the present case amounted to a violation 
of article 19, paragraph 2, of the Covenant.38
As far as political parties are concerned, they are regarded as 
indispensable institutions in a democratic society, by which 
ideas are formed, imparted, defended and debated. Accor-
dingly, political parties enjoy the greatest possible freedom 
of political expression. Accordingly, the EurCtHR has cons-
tantly ruled:
[…] Political parties make an irreplaceable contribu-
tion to political debate, which is at the very core of 
the concept of a democratic society.39
Therefore, it is logical to conclude that the margin allowed 
by this court to restrict the freedom of political parties is 
considerably reduced, as it has yielded in a series of cases: 
In view of the essential role played by political par-
ties in the proper functioning of democracy, the ex-
ceptions set out in Art. 11 are, where political parties 
concerned, to be construed strictly; only convincing 
and compelling reasons can justify restrictions on 
such parties’ freedom of association. In determining 
whether a necessity within the meaning of art. 11, 
37 HRC: case of Zeljko Bodrozic v. Serbia and Montenegro, Communication No. 
1180/2003, Views of 31/10/2005 U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/85/D/1180/2003 (2006), 
§ 7.2.
38 HRC, case of Aduayom et al. v Togo, supra, § 7.4.
39 EurCtHR: cases of Castells v. Spain supra, § 43, Lingens v. Austria, supra, § 42; 
and Communist Party and Others v. Turkey, judgment of 25/05/1998. Reports 
1998-III, § 44.
§ 2 exists, the Contracting States have only a limi-
ted margin of appreciation, which goes hand in hand 
with rigorous European supervision.40
Such wide protection granted to the political parties is ex-
tended to the elected members of political parties, as it 
rules: 
“While freedom of expression is important for every-
body, it is especially so for an elected representative 
of the people. He represents his electorate, draws at-
tention to their preoccupations and defends their in-
terests. Accordingly, interferences with the freedom of 
expression of an opposition member of Parliament call 
for the closest scrutiny on the part of the Court”.41
Likewise, members of the parliament usually enjoy legal 
immunity under national legislations, consisting of total or 
partial protection from prosecution on acts and speeches re-
lated to their institutional duties. Such immunity is present 
in a number of States’ constitutions. 
The freedom of political speech is usually interpreted in con-
nection with the content of democracy. To date, the inter-
national human rights monitoring bodies have not given a 
comprehensive and decisive conception of democracy, even 
because this seems to be an enormous task for a monitoring 
body. However, these bodies have considered the relation-
ship of democracy and the international legal instruments 
they interpret and apply to concrete cases. In this task, these 
bodies have indicated some of the elements of democracy 
that apply to the rights enshrined in the respective instru-
ments. The EurCtHR, for instance, has stated that the prin-
cipal characteristic of democracy is “the possibility it offers 
through dialogue, without recourse to violence, issues raised 
by different strands of political opinion.”42 Moreover, it rei-
terates that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness are 
the hallmarks of a democratic society.43 In some other cases, 
40 EurCtHR: cases of Socialist Party and Others v. Turkey, supra, § 50; and Chris-
tian Democratic People’s Party v. Moldova, supra, § 68.
41 EurCtHR: case of Castells v. Spain, supra § 42.
42 EurCtHR: case of cases of Partidul Comunistilor (Nepeceristi) and Ungureanu v. 
Romania, judgment of 3/02/2005, § 55.
43 V.g. EurCtHR: cases of Handyside v. United Kingdom, judgment of 7/12/1976. 
Series A, No. 24, § 49; Lingens v. Austria judgment of 8/06/1986, Series A, 
No. 103, § 41. Christian Democratic People’s Party v. Moldova, judgment of 
14/02/2006, § 64.
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the same court has granted protection to the political mino-
rities, avoiding the so-called “dictatorship of the majority”, 
as it states:
“Although individual interests must on occasion be 
subordinated to those of a group, democracy does not 
simply mean that the views of the majority always 
prevail: a balance must be achieved which ensures 
the fair and proper treatment of minorities and avoid 
any abuse of a dominant position”44
Moreover, under the European system, restrictions to Arts. 
10 and 11 (freedom of association) of the ECHR, involving 
political parties, have been especially placed under special 
scrutiny in the last decade, principally taking into account 
the accession of the former socialist regimes, which used to 
lack a multi-party political system. 
The relevant case-law seems to mean by pluralism the pos-
sibility of different groups to freely exchange their views, 
which consists of the most basic feature of a democratic so-
ciety. Though this court sets the basic rules of the democra-
tic game, one observes that the relevant approach is rather a 
formal than a substantive one. 
Anyhow, political speech, like general speech, is not an ab-
solute right and, according to international human rights 
case-law, States may impose restrictions to it. The EurCtHR 
has constantly ruled:
Freedom of association and political debate is not 
absolute […] and it must be accepted that where 
freedom of association, through its activities or the 
intentions it has expressly or implied declared in its 
programme, jeopoardizes the State’s institutions or 
the rights or the freedoms of the others, Art. 11 does 
not deprive the State of the power to protect those 
institutions and persons. It is for the governments. It 
is for the Court to give a final ruling on the compa-
tibility of such measures with the freedom of expres-
sion enshrined in Art. 10.45
44 EurCtHR: cases of Chassagnou and Others v. France, judgment of 29/04/1999. 
Reports 1999, III, § 46; Christian Democratic People’s Party v. Moldova, judg-
ment 14/05/ 2006, § 64.
45 EurCtHR: cases of Christian Democratic People’s Party v. Moldova, supra, § 68; 
and Observer and Guardian v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 26/11/1991. 
Series A, No. 216, § 59.
A clear border between freedom of political expression and 
the prohibition of discrimination had been yielded by the 
early case-law, mainly based on the prohibition of the des-
truction or abuse of the rights of others.46 The case of X. v. 
Federal Republic of Germany is a clear example. The applicant 
complained to have his freedom of expression (Art. 10 of 
the ECHR) violated since a judicial decision had forbidden 
him to bear and exhibit brochures that denied the existence 
of the holocaust. The former EurCmmHR ruled that, since 
his aim was to destroy the rights of others, he could not in-
voke the protection of the European Convention’s rights.47
Moreover, in the case of Glimmerveen and others v. the Ne-
therlands48, the applicant, chairman of the Dutch ‘Volks 
Unie’ party, was sentenced to imprisonment for having dis-
seminated pamphlets of clear racist content and for having 
advocated for the repatriation of non-white guest workers. 
He alleged to have his freedom of expression violated by the 
respondent State, which also confiscated the pamphlets and 
invalidated electoral lists containing his name. Likewise, the 
HRC has ruled a number of other applications inadmissible 
concerning individuals, including politicians, convicted for 
racist, fascist and revisionist discourses. Among these cases, 
it is worthy mentioning one involving an applicant who 
challenged an Italian law that criminalized the political 
engagement to reconstitute a fascist party.49 Both the HRC 
and the EurCtHR relied on the prohibition of destruction 
or abuse of rights of others to deny treaty protection.50 The 
46 Art. 17 of the ECHR reads as follows: “Nothing in this Convention may be 
interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in 
any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights 
and freedoms set forth herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than 
is provided for in the Convention.” Art. 5.1 of the ICCPR reads as follows: 
“1. Nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for any 
State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act 
aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms recognized herein 
or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the present 
Covenant.”
47 EurCommHR: case of X. v. Federal Republic of Germany of 30/09/1974. Appli-
cation No. 6315/73, D.R. 1, p. 73.
48 EurCtHR: case of Glimmerveen and Others v. The Netherlands, App. Nos. 
8348/78 and 8406/78, 18 D & R 187 (1980), 5 EHRR 260 (1982).
49 HRC: case of M.A. v. Italy. Communication 117/1981. Inadmissibility deci-
sion of 10/04/1984 UN Doc. CCPR/C/OP/2, pp. 31-33, § 13.3.
50 Art. 5.1 of the ICCPR reads as follows: “Nothing in the present Covenant 
may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to en-
gage in any activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the 
rights and freedoms recognized herein or at their limitation to a greater extent 
than is provided for in the present Covenant. Art. 17 of the ECHR reads as 
follows: “Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any 
State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act 
aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein or 
at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the Convention.” 
Art. 29 (A) of the ACHR reads as follows: “No provision of this Convention 
shall be interpreted as permitting any State Party, group, or person to suppress 
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refusal to examine the merits of the above cases represents 
a clear signal to potential applicants seeking human rights 
treaty protection for their discriminatory discourse. 
However, cases with such profile have recently not appeared 
before human rights monitoring bodies anymore. A plausi-
ble reason for such disappearance is the modification of the 
style and level of the respective political platforms, in order 
to formally comply with the relevant standards, as demons-
trated in section 2 of this work.
Despite the fact that States may impose restrictions on po-
litical speech, the EurCtHR is only prepared to approve any 
interference with political parties and members of the par-
liament if the criterion of necessity is met. Moreover, the 
pressing social need, which justifies the criterion of neces-
sity, is assessed on proportionality between the threatening 
posed by the party and the sort of restrictive measure applied 
by the State. Accordingly, severe measures, including the 
dissolution of a political party and the prohibition of its 
members to exercise their political rights might take place 
only in the gravest circumstances.51
For instance, in the case of Refah Partisi v. Turkey, the EurC-
tHR held that, in a circumstance where a political party had 
a program to install the sharia regime by force, having this 
party a real potential of taking over of the political system in 
the country, the State had shown the necessity to take mea-
sures to protect the secular political regime. Given the real 
threat and potential damage to be caused by the actions of 
the party in question, this court also deemed the dissolution 
of the party a proportional measure.52
Moreover, the EurCtHR examines the behavior of political 
parties and members of the parliament. It can be said that 
this Court has a realistic manner of analyzing their beha-
vior, not taking only their program into account, but also 
the actions of their leaders and the position defended by 
them within the parliament and in the society in general. 
Accordingly, the EurCtHR constantly states:
“The constitution of a program of a political party 
cannot be taken into account as the sole criterion 
the enjoyment or exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized in this Con-
vention or to restrict them to a greater extent than is provided for herein.”
51 This approach was taken in the case of Socialist Party and Others v. Turkey
judgment, supra, § 51.
52 EurCtHR: case of Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) v. Turkey, Grand Chamber 
judgment of 13/02/2003. Reports 2003-II, § 134.
for determining its objectives and intentions; the 
contents of the program must be compared with the 
actions of the party’s leaders and the positions they 
defend.”53
It is noted that the relevant case-law, as in the general free-
dom of expression, attaches great importance to physical 
violence to which hate speech might lead, rather than other 
forms of violence, including advocacy for exclusion and pre-
ference of certain groups in detriment to others. While it is 
desired that the threshold of political speech remains high, 
the EurCtHR could make full usage of the scope of hate 
speech, as specified in the Recommendation No. R (97) 20. 
Under this scope, a great amount of light can be shed on the 
gray zones where the so-called “sophisticated hate speech” 
resides.
Moreover, a substantive approach of democracy, rather than 
only a formal one, is mostly welcome in the examined case-
law, particularly to address the conflicts between freedom of 
expression and the prohibition of discrimination. As Baer in 
2000 notes, an equality approach to the freedom of expres-
sion should abandon the realm of neutrality and encompass 
the victims’ perspectives, though in a given case they are 
not identifiable. 
The CERD Committee, for its part, went beyond the said 
‘neutrality’ and gave a sharp interpretation of the freedom 
of expression, more specifically of parliamentarian speech. 
In the case of Hassan Gelle v. Denmark,an article written by 
a parliamentarian in a major newspaper labelled the Somali 
community in Denmark as “paedophile” and “rapist”. This 
Committee, though noting that that the article was written 
in a political context, as it related to the enactment of legis-
lation prohibiting child abuse, held the responding State in 
violation of the CERD convention, since it failed to investi-
gate and prosecute the member of parliament, author of the 
racist article. This Committee expressed:
[…] the Committee considers that the fact that Ms. 
Kjærsgaard’s statements were made in the context of 
a political debate does not absolve the State party 
from its obligation to investigate whether or not her 
53 EurCtHR: cases of Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) v. Turkey , supra, § 101; 
United Communist Party v. Turkey, supra, § 46; Socialist Party and Others v. Tur-
key, supra, § 50; Freedom and Democracy Party v. Turkey, § 45; and Segerstedt-
Wiberg and Others v. Sweden, judgment of 06/06/2006, § 91. 
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statements amounted to racial discrimination. It rei-
terates that the exercise of the right to freedom of 
expression carries special duties and responsibilities, 
in particular the obligation not to disseminate racist 
ideas, and recalls that General Recommendation 30 
recommends that States parties take “resolute action 
to counter any tendency to target, stigmatize, stereo-
type or profile, on the basis of race, colour, descent, 
and national or ethnic origin, members of ‘non-
citizen’ population groups, especially by politicians 
[...].”
The CERD Committee, therefore, concluded that not even 
the parliamentarian speech is unfettered, but should com-
ply with the CERD’s prohibition of racial discrimination. 
Therefore, as public agents, members of the parliament are 
under a negative obligation to abstain from disseminating 
racist ideas. Moreover, the State concerned is under a posi-
tive obligation to investigate, try and, if found guilty, punish 
the violator. 
Compared with the EurCtHR’s case law, the CERD appro-
ach has some advantages. Firstly, it places limits for the 
racist speech disseminated by members of the parliament. 
Secondly, it states a clear positive obligation upon States 
to address racialist speech. Thirdly, this particular decision 
embraces a collective approach, since the victim, as an in-
dividual of Somali origin, could file a petition, since he felt 
affected by the offense targeting the whole Somali commu-
nity. 
Therefore, the CERD Committee has a more substantive 
approach than the EurCtHR that addresses the problems of 
democracy and plurality only in a very formal fashion. A 
more substantive approach by the European system is highly 
welcome in future judgments. The HRC, for its part, could 
profit from the CERD jurisprudence and make a more com-
prehensive use of ICCPR’s Article 26.
4. Political Advocacy against the International Equality 
Standards
One intriguing question is to what extent a political par-
ty may pursue modifications in the constitutional or legal 
system of a State, which are contradiction to the interna-
tional human rights acquis. In other words, to what extent 
are the incorporated international standards allowed to be 
modified? Or, more specifically, are political parties allowed 
to advocate or propose bills in disregard to the equality stan-
dards to which their States agreed to abide by?
Firstly, the provisions of human rights treaties are to be in-
terpreted in good faith, according to the principle of pacta
sund servanda, enshrined in the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties.54 This condition is to be fulfilled in all State 
acts, including the acts of Parliament. Secondly, provisions 
of internal law cannot be invoked to justify the non-perfor-
mance of a given treaty, according to the same convention.55
In this connection, the I/ACtHR has ruled that national 
legislation that are incompatible with the ACHR lack total 
legal effect. In the cases of Barrios Altos v. Peru56 and Moiwa-
na Community v. Suriname57, involving the enactment of 
self-amnesty law in order to hinder the investigations of the 
crimes occurred, this court held that the adoption of such le-
gislation was against the spirit of the American Convention 
and therefore lacked legal effect. Moreover, in the case of 
Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al. v. Trinidad y Tobago,
related to the enactment of legislation in disregard to the 
death penalty principles enshrined in the ACHR, this court 
stated:
If the States, pursuant to Article 2 of the American 
Convention, have a positive obligation to adopt the 
legislative measures necessary to guarantee the exer-
cise of the rights recognised in the Convention, it 
follows, then, that they also must refrain both from 
promulgating laws that disregard or impede the free 
exercise of these rights, and from suppressing or mo-
difying the existing laws protecting them. These acts 
would likewise constitute a violation of Article 2 of 
the Convention.58
Therefore, according to the above decision, States are under 
an obligation to refrain from enacting legislation in contra-
diction with the human rights treaties they have ratified. 
54 Art. 26 of this Convention reads as follows: Article 26 “Every treaty in force is 
binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.”
55 Art. 27: “A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justifica-
tion for its failure to perform a treaty.”
56 I/A Court H.R., case of Barrios-Altos v. Peru, judgment March 14, 2001. Series 
C No. 75, § 42.
57 I/A Court H.R., case of the Moiwana Community v. Suriname, judgment of 
June 15, 2005. Series C, No. 124, § 137.
58 I/A Court H.R., case of Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al. v. Trinidad y 
Tobago, judgment of June 21, 2002. Series C No. 94, § 113.
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The European counterpart, in a number of cases, has crea-
ted two main conditions for the campaigning in the legal 
constitutional structures: (a) that the political party uses 
legal and means and that (b) the changes proposed must be 
compatible with the fundamental democratic principles.59
As regards, the first criterion, owing to the sophistication 
of the political discriminatory discourse, hardly any of the 
so-called extremist parties would incur in illegal acts in or-
der to advocate for and propose discriminatory legislation. 
As regards the second criterion, the EurCtHR itself utilizes 
rather a formal than a substantive approach, as previously 
mentioned. Thus, it is questionable whether the sophistica-
ted discriminatory discourse is to be detected through this 
substantive approach.
The cases mentioned from the Inter-American system are 
related to the gravest violations of human rights. One may 
argue that human rights courts should prohibit the en-
actment of legislation contrary to the relevant treaty only 
in the most serious cases, for example, when involving the 
right to life and the right to personal integrity. However, the 
right to be equally treated, together with these rights, has 
a non-derogable and cannot be suppressed nor restrictively 
interpreted even in the most adverse circumstances. In this 
connection, the I/ACtHR has stated:
Such [restrictive] measures must also not violate the 
State Party’s other international legal obligations, nor 
may they involve “discrimination on the ground of 
race, color, sex, language, religion or social origin.”60
Therefore, not even fight for terrorism nor an adverse eco-
nomic situation of a country are sufficient grounds to advo-
cate and pursue modifications of the internal legal system to 
the detriment of the general prohibition of discrimination. 
Moreover, members of the Parliament perform their 
functions as State agents. As such, they are directly bound 
by human rights treaties. The traditional “black box” theory 
has lost its raison d’être in view that these treaties bind not 
only the central executive branch, which represents the 
State internationally, but all the other branches, in all its 
59 EurCtHR: case of Yazar and Others v. Turkey, ECHR 2002-II, § 49; Refah Par-
tisi (the Welfare Party) and others v. Turkey, supra, § 98.
60 I/A Court H.R., Habeas corpus in Emergency Situations (Arts. 27(2), 25(1) and 
7(6) American Convention on Human Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-8/87 of 
January 30, 1987. Series A No. 8, § 19.
hierarchical or territorial divisions. Currently, this unders-
tanding has being used beyond international human rights 
courts, reaching other bodies of international dispute settle-
ment (Ferdinandusse, 2003).
Therefore, there is no argument in human rights law, which 
authorizes legislative changes that are incompatible with the 
equality standards related to the treaties ratified by a State.
However, some areas of human rights law themselves repre-
sent a real backdrop as regards the prohibition of discrimi-
nation. One of these areas are the provisions of a number of 
human rights treaties, which allow States to apply distinc-
tions between nationals and non-nationals. Although such 
provisions are to be restrictively interpreted, the existence 
per se of these provisions encourages the extension of their 
interpretation. Moreover, States remain hesitant to adopt a 
substantive approach on equality. One indication of this he-
sitance is the considerably low number of ratifications of the 
Protocol 12 to the ECHR.61 Therefore, a sensible grey zone 
still exists within the right to be equally treated.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Although human rights monitoring bodies have rightly set 
standards that prohibit hate speech, in its most know forms, 
the contemporary discriminatory discourse tends to get so-
phisticated shapes and justifications in order to adapt to the-
se standards so as to enjoy a legitimate label among society. 
This movement has been fostered mainly by the inflamed 
fight against terrorism and the adverse economic situation 
in most countries in the Northern Atlantic region. 
Freedom of speech is one of the greatest achievements of 
modern civilization and should be strongly protected. Only 
serious justifications should allow States to restrict freedom 
of expression and, when applied, should be proportionate 
to the damage caused. The sophisticated discourse should 
not have the effect of lowering down the threshold of the 
acceptable level of controversial speech. Especially political 
debate should be respected to the greatest extent possible, 
allowing plurality of ideas and tolerance.
61 Protocol No. 12 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms CETS No.: 177, adopted on 04/11/2000 and entered 
into force on 01/04/2005.
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However, the change in the current case-law should be ra-
ther a qualitative than a quantitative one. Human rights 
courts and monitoring bodies could give a immeasurable 
contribution if they explore the respect for the equality be-
yond the concept of physical violence and examine deeper 
other forms of discriminatory violence that might occur. 
Moreover, the substantive content of democracy, which in-
cludes social and racial inclusion, is highly welcomed in the 
standard-setting activity of human rights systems.
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